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The geography of Brexit – what geography? Modelling and 
predicting the outcome across 380 local authorities 
 
David Manley, Kelvyn Jones and Ron Johnston 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Most of the analysis before the 2016 referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the European 
Union based on opinion polling data focused on which groups were more likely to support each of the 
two options, with less attention to the geography of that support – although some regions, especially 
London and Scotland, were expected to provide substantial support for Remain. Using a recently-
developed procedure for detailed exploration of large tables derived from survey data, this paper 
presents the result of a prediction of the outcome across local authorities in Great Britain using just 
two variables – age and qualifications. In relative terms, that prediction was reasonably accurate – 
although, reflecting the polls’ over-estimate of support for Remain – it under-estimated the number 
of places where Leave gained a majority, as was also the case within local authorities where data 
were published by ward. The model’s predictive value was enhanced by post hoc incorporation of 
information on turnout and the number of registered electors, and taking these into account there 
was little evidence of substantial, additional regional variation in levels of support for Leave. Overall, 
regions were relatively unimportant as influences on the referendum outcome once the 
characteristics of the people living there were taken into account. 
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In the months leading up to the United Kingdom’s referendum on 23 June 2016 on whether to leave 
the European Union (EU) much discussion based on opinion polls focused on the likely outcome 
nationally. Relatively little attention was paid to the geography of support for the Leave and Remain 
campaigns, although there was some discussion of likely regional variations – both London and 
Scotland were expected to provide a larger majority for Remain than any other regions. Apart from 
reporting the predicted percentages for Leave and Remain, plus the Don’t Knows, most other 
attention to the polling data focused on which socio-economic and -demographic groups were 
providing most support for each side, although the heading to one distinguished newspaper 
commentator’s – Simon Jenkins – column on the issue was ‘Gender, age and political party are no 
guide as to how we’ll vote’.1 
 
After the referendum results were announced by each local authority in England, Scotland 
and Wales2 attention again focused on which groups favoured Leave and which favoured Remain, 
with several commentators using ecological analyses combining the referendum outcome with 2011 
census and other data for each local authority. These both attempted to identify those groups and 
explored whether there were any significant spatial variations; were residents of some regions more 
                                                          
1 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/31/brexit-gender-age-political-party-vote - 
accessed 12 October 2016. 
2 The result for Northern Ireland was reported for the country as a whole, although they were also 
disaggregated according to its 18 Parliamentary constituencies. As the opinion poll data deployed here did not 
cover Northern Ireland they are not included in the analyses; nor are those for Gibraltar, whose residents also 
voted in the referendum. 
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likely to support Remain than others, irrespective of their population composition? For example, 
Goodwin and Heath (2016) reported that 68 per cent of variation in the percentage voting Leave was 
positively related to the percentage of people aged 65 and over in a local authority and to the 
percentage of residents there with no educational qualifications; holding those patterns constant 
support for Brexit was lower in London and Scotland than elsewhere and slightly lower (marginally 
statistically significant only) the larger the number of EU migrants in the area. (On the voting 
pattern, see also Clarke et al., 2017, and Evans and Tilley, 2017.) 
 
Such ecological analyses throw considerable light, if only implicit because of the potential for 
committing the ecological fallacy, on which groups within British society strongly favoured the UK 
leaving the EU. Goodwin and Heath (2016, 331) concluded that their findings: 
… gave full expression to … [deep] divides in Britain that cut across generational, educational 
and class lines. The public vote for Brexit was anchored predominantly, albeit not 
exclusively, in areas of the country that are filled with pensioners, low-skilled and less well-
educated blue-collar workers and citizens who have been pushed to the margins not only by 
the economic transformation of the country over recent decades but also by the values that 
have come to dominate a more socially liberal media and political class. In this respect the 
vote for Brexit was delivered by the ‘left behind’ – social groups that are united by a general 
sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalisation … 
Such a conclusion goes well beyond what the data show directly, and reflects wider interpretations 
of the referendum outcome. Furthermore, it suggests a clear geography to that outcome: support 
for Brexit was ‘anchored’ in those parts of the country where members of the ‘left behind’ groups 
are concentrated,3 with two regions standing out as separate from the rest: London (where the 
socially liberal political class are concentrated?); and Scotland (an increasingly separate polity where 
the dominant political party locates many of that country’s problems emanating from 
London/England and sees the EU as a better arena for their solution). 
 
Does that geographical argument stand up to greater scrutiny or is it that – in Agnew’s 
(1990) terminology – the observed spatial differences in the outcome were only epiphenomenal, 
reflecting differences between places in their population composition rather than differences that 
are place-specific; did local environments matter? To address that question, this paper reports on a 
parallel exploration to that of Goodwin and Heath, plus others who have adopted an ecological 
approach: Harris and Charlton (2016, 11), for example, conclude that ‘the UK is clearly fragmented 
with notable differences between people and places’. Following Agnew, this raises the question 
whether there are significant differences between places once those between people are taken into 
account. 
 
To address that issue, this paper reports on research using a methodology that extends 
beyond ecological analysis, combining poll/survey with aggregate/areal data in a robust modelling 
framework. (For an alternative approach to the same general issue, see Hanretty, 2016.) It enables 
formal testing of the relative importance of ‘people vs place’ in appreciating what influenced the 
observed geography of the vote – of importance in later debates regarding whether the 
implementation of post-Brexit policies should be place-specific; overall, the results of the analyses 
presented here suggest that, with few exceptions, knowledge of an area’s population characteristics 
was sufficient and  additional information about place – region – provided little advance on that 
appreciation. 
 
A predictive model 
 
                                                          
3 Jennings et al. (2016) suggest that these regions are also those with the highest levels of political discontent. 
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Voting behaviour in Great Britain, as elsewhere, is closely linked to people’s social positions and 
related attitudes. This has been demonstrated regarding attitudes to the EU over the last two 
decades by variations in support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), whose main 
policy platform has been that the UK should leave the EU. Most analyses have shown that this party 
has gained greatest support from those who have been relatively disadvantaged during the 
increased globalisation of the world economy over the last half-century (see, for example, Goodwin 
and Milazzo, 2015; Evans and Mellon, 2016; Cutts et al., 2017). They have not benefited substantially 
from the economic growth which accompanied that trend; indeed they may well have been 
disadvantaged by the widening income inequalities and it has been suggested to them – by some 
politicians and media outlets, for example – that this, in part, has been the result of the increasing 
scale of international migration associated with liberal trade regimes, not least that operated by the 
EU. (Net migration to the UK has exceeded 100,000 each year in the last decade.) They comprise 
what has been termed the ‘anxious class’, or the ‘left behinds’ (termed the ‘precariat’ by Standing, 
2016), and their anxiety has been expressed through distrust of the politicians (across several 
parties) they consider responsible for the globalisation-related inequalities. This is linked to a belief, 
again strongly promoted by some media outlets and politicians, that withdrawal from the EU – 
regaining UK sovereignty and ‘control of our borders’ and being free to ‘make our own laws’ again – 
can reverse the growing inequality and result in increased life-chances for those currently 
disadvantaged (not least by improving both their employment prospects and their access to welfare 
state benefits in health, housing and education). Those beliefs are especially associated with older 
voters, particularly men, and those with few qualifications, who have provided the bedrock of 
growing support for the British main anti-EU political party – the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), as shown in Jones et al. (2016). 
 
If support for leaving the UK is concentrated among those groups, therefore, then it should 
be possible, by knowing where they live and their propensity to vote Leave before the referendum 
was held, to predict where support for that change would be strongest, and also to evaluate 
whether that compositional knowledge was sufficient to account for any observed spatial variation 
in support for Brexit. We use data from a long sequence of political opinion polls conducted between 
15 March 2015 and 7 March 2016, comprising over 60,000 separate observations.4 Respondents 
were asked whether they favoured Leave or Remain or were Undecided.5 There was no substantial 
variation in the percentages for the three responses over the year-long period; overall some 56 per 
cent favoured Remain in each of the four quarters and 36 per cent favoured Leave, and so we did 
not use the time of the survey as a variable in the modelling. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The polling data included several pieces of information about each respondent, which were 
explored to find the best predictors of support for the options. As described in detail elsewhere 
(Jones et al., 2016), we favoured a modelling approach built on Occam’s Razor principles, but which 
– unlike many statistical models of voting behaviour – took into account the interactions between 
the chosen variables as well as the main effects that are the usual focus of such modelling. The goal 
was to generate a robust estimate of the proportion of members of each group likely to vote Leave 
across Great Britain’s 380 local authority districts (LADs), given the variation within the polling data. 
Some cells of the matrices examined had large numbers of observations on which to base a precise 
                                                          
4 We are grateful to Anthony Wells of YouGov for making these data available to us. 
5 The question offered five options: Strongly in favour of Britain remaining in the EU; Slightly in favour of 
Britain remaining in the EU; Don’t know; Slightly in favour of Britain leaving the EU; and Strongly in favour of 
Britain leaving the EU. Initial analysis suggested no significant differences across the groups considered 
between the first and second and the fourth and fifth responses, so these were combined to give the threefold 
responses – Remain; Undecided; Leave. 
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estimate of the required proportion, whereas others had few and if they were given equal weight 
the resulting estimate could be biased.6 Further, since we were wanting to predict the outcome in 
each of the 380 separate reporting areas this gave a very large multi-variable matrix – in the final 
version selected for use here 5 age groups x 5 qualifications categories x 380 LADs x 3 outcomes 
(Leave, Remain, Undecided). The polling data were not evenly distributed across the LADs, as shown 
In Figure 1, so we deployed a modelling strategy which ensured that the support patterns in LADs 
with few respondents did not bias the overall estimate. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In determining which respondent characteristics (independent variables) to include in the 
model we were led by analyses of the 2015 general election results, using data from the British 
Election Study (BES) post-election survey and influenced by information on which groups the various 
referendum campaigns were focusing their efforts on (see Shipman, 2016). This showed that support 
for UKIP varied significantly by age, by sex, and by educational qualifications, including interactions 
among those three variables (Jones et al. 2016): older men with degrees were significantly more 
likely to vote UKIP than expected according to a null model of no difference by age, sex and 
qualifications; older women with degrees were not (Table 1). The figures in this table are the 
modelled ratios between the observed number of voters in that cell and the expected number given 
a null model of no difference across the cells. A value greater than 1.0 indicates more than expected 
and a value less than 1.0 indicates less; a figure in bold indicates a statistically significant difference 
from 1.0 at the 0.05 probability level or better.) Analysis of the EU referendum polling data showed 
no difference by sex when the other two variables were taken into account, however, and so the 
modelling focused on just age (in five groups), qualifications (also in five groups), and LAD (380).7  
 
The modelling 
 
The multi-level modelling approach applied here was developed for the prediction of health and 
health-related characteristics of local area populations, combining survey with census data (Twigg et 
al., 2000, 2006; Twigg and Moon, 2002; Mohan et al., 2005). National surveys can provide reliable 
estimates of differences across population groups in their propensity to adopt certain types of 
behaviour – such as smoking and drinking – but most of them are too sparse (have too few 
observations) to give similar reliable estimates of those propensities in separate geographical areas.  
 
Multi-level modelling produces estimates of the extent to which individuals in each cell of a 
contingency table (in this case, age by educational qualifications) were nationally likely  to vote 
Leave or Remain, or were Undecided. The multi-level model also contained terms that picked up the 
distinctiveness of each LAD after taking account of age and qualifications. Importantly, given the 
small number of respondents in some areas, this estimate of local difference is precision-weighted 
so that unreliable rates are shrunk back to the national estimate (Jones and Bullen, 1994). The 
national rates and local differences were then combined to derive a (5 x 5 x 3) probability matrix for 
each of the sub-areas being studied (the 380 LADs in this case). These ‘local’ probabilities of the 
outcome were then applied to the counts of the same predictor variables (age and qualifications) for 
each area obtained from the full enumeration of the 2011 census, thereby deriving a predicted 
count of those who were likely to fall into each outcome category.  
 
                                                          
6 For example, the final 5 x 5 matrix used in the modelling (five age groups and five educational qualification 
levels) had some cells with fewer than 250 respondents. 
7 One possibility for this difference with regard to the sexes is that UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage, was considered 
unattractive by many women because of his association with smoking and heavy drinking. Women were much 
less discomfited by the leaders of the Leave campaign, however, notably Boris Johnson. 
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The national modelled pattern for age, qualification and Leave is shown in Table 2. Support 
for Brexit was, as expected, greatest among the older respondents and those with few or no 
educational qualifications, but the gradient between the least and the most qualified was steepest 
among the older age groups – justification for use of a modelling strategy that takes the interaction 
between the two variables into account. Thus there was little difference among those aged under 35 
in their propensity to vote Leave whatever their qualifications level, whereas among older groups 
there were substantial differences; among those aged 65 and over, for example, individuals with no 
educational qualifications were 50 per cent more likely to vote Leave than those with Level 4 
(degrees and their equivalents).  
 
These estimates assumed that all adults voted in each area – indeed, that all were registered 
electors and were able to vote. This is clearly not the case. Turnout at recent British general 
elections has only been about two-thirds of the registered electorate – and that in turn is believed to 
be only 85 per cent complete. Furthermore, turnout is known to vary substantially across groups 
within the population: for the two groups studied here, the young are much less likely to vote than 
their older contemporaries, and those with no or few qualifications are similarly more likely to 
abstain than the well-qualified. To take these variations into account, therefore, we weighted the 
values in the matrix cells for each LAD according to a national estimate of likely turnout. For the 
latter, we used a matrix derived from the 2015 British Election Study (BES) post-election survey; as 
with all surveys this significantly under-states the number of abstainers, but as our interest was in 
relative rather than absolute rates of turnout between age and qualification groups we did not 
standardise the data further. The number of individuals in each 5 x 5 cell for each LAD was reduced 
by the relevant percentage, and the expected proportion voting Leave, Remain or Undecided then 
applied. That matrix was then used to get the overall estimated sums and proportions for each of 
the three outcomes for each of the 380 LADs. This led to an inflation of support for Brexit in all areas 
of up to 3.7 percentage points compared to the estimates assuming 100 per cent turnout, sufficient 
in a tight contest to determine the overall outcome there and hence in the number of areas where 
Leave had more support than Remain. 
 
The modelled geography 
 
The modelled geography of support for Leave is shown in Figure 2. This combines two elements – 
the compositional element due to local differences in the age and qualifications of people in 
different areas – and the contextual variations – the LAD differences in the polling data after taking 
account of the demographic variables. (That for Remain is virtually the mirror image of the pattern in 
Figure 2 since there was little spatial variation in the geography of the Undecideds – a mean of 0.11 
with a standard deviation of 0.018). 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As an initial check of the reliability of that predicted geography, and of Simon Jenkins’s 
claim, we regressed the values for each LAD against the percentage who voted for UKIP at the 2014 
European Parliament election, when that party – whose predominant policy was for the UK to 
withdraw from the EU – won the largest share of the votes. (Heath and Goodwin, 2016, undertook a 
similar check.) There is a reasonably strong relationship, with the main exceptions from the general 
positive trend being in Scotland (whose LADs are separately identified in Figure 3); UKIP performed 
                                                          
8 The regression is %Leave = 0.843 – 0.913%Remain: r2 = 0.978. 
 6 
 
uniformly poorly there in 2014 with a mean of just 0.11 (standard deviation 0.01) compared with the 
more differentiated situation in England and Wales (mean 0.33, standard deviation 0.08).  
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
UKIP voters formed the core of those who supported Leave two years later. Wave 9 of the 
2015 BES survey, conducted after the referendum was held in 2016, showed that 95 per cent of 
those who voted for UKIP in 2015 voted Leave a year later: the comparable figures for the other 
parties were – Conservative, 62 per cent; Labour 32 per cent; Liberal Democrat, 28 per cent; Green, 
20 per cent; SNP, 32 per cent; and Plaid Cymru, 23 per cent. 
 
Testing the prediction 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Given that our modelling produced a reasonable post-diction of the 2014 election result, how 
accurate was its prediction of the 2016 referendum vote? Clearly the polling data used were wrong 
in expecting a majority for Remain (as were almost all other polls), but was the pattern of support 
for Leave consistent with that predicted; did we predict the relative levels of support across the 380 
LADs correctly even if the absolute levels were wrong? The map of the predicted outcome suggests 
that was the case (compare Figure 4 with Figure 2), which the scatter plot of the observed support 
against the predicted in each of the LADs confirms (Figure 5). Reflecting the under-prediction of 
support for Leave overall, the slope of the regression between the two is steeper than 1.0, but the 
relationship between them is close.9 Our modelling, using the cross-classification of just two 
demographic characteristics across the 380 LADs, was successful in predicting the relative strength 
of support for Leave across the country (the goodness-of-fit coefficient showing that it accounted for 
two-thirds of the variation across local authorities). 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Extending the analysis 
 
The modelling was largely successful, therefore, but that it did not produce an even closer fit raises 
questions of where it failed, in relative terms, either by substantially over- or under-predicting 
support for Brexit. In particular, was there geographical variation additional to any spatial patterning 
resulting from variations in the age and qualifications composition of local populations, which is 
taken into account in the model? Or were there other variables – excluded from the original 
modelling – that were significantly linked to support for the Leave option? 
 
Regarding the latter element of that question, there was much concern during the pre-
referendum campaign regarding two issues – turnout and electoral registration. As well-established 
in British electoral studies, there is a clear relationship between turnout and age; older people are 
much more likely to vote than their younger contemporaries.10 Where turnout is high, therefore, 
more young people are likely to have voted, so that areas with low turnout should – ceteris paribus – 
have shown greater support for Brexit. Turnout was high at the referendum (72 per cent, some six 
                                                          
9 The full regression is PropLeave = -0.04 + 1.43 PredictedPropLeave; r2 = 0.67 
10 The BES post-referendum survey substantially underrepresented non-voting, but still showed a more than 
four-fold difference between those aged 65 and over and those aged 18-25 in the proportion of non-voters. 
Goodwin and Heath’s (2016) ecological analyses of turnout at the referendum showed that it increased the 
larger the LAD’s percentage of people aged 65 and over and decreased the larger the percentage of individuals 
with no qualifications; they did not explore the interaction between the two. 
 7 
 
percentage points higher than at recent general elections) but it varied considerably, being relatively 
high in much of southern England but low across most of Scotland (Figure 6).  
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The second issue concerns electoral registration. Although this is compulsory it was 
estimated that as many as eight million eligible voters were not on the electoral roll in December 
2015 (Electoral Commission, 2016), and those disenfranchised individuals were concentrated among 
the young, ethnic minorities, recent migrants/movers, students, and flat-dwellers. Their absence 
from the electoral roll was exacerbated by a decision in summer 2015 to end the transition to 
Individual Electoral Registration (IER) early. (The legislation set December 2016 as the final date but 
gave the government the option of ending the transition a year early – which it did, against the 
advice of the Electoral Commission.) The electoral roll is recompiled each autumn and finalised in 
December of that year. Before 2015 one person in each household was required to register all 
eligible voters living there, but since then individuals have had to register themselves and in autumn 
2015 if they were on the existing roll but did not apply to re-register they were removed; many 
were, especially among the groups just listed. Those not on the electoral roll at their current 
residence can apply to do so up to ten days before any poll, and much effort was expended during 
the first half of 2016 to encourage those not enrolled to register so that they could vote in the 
referendum. This had a varied response: in some places – notably several London boroughs plus the 
cities of Cambridge, Canterbury and Oxford, plus the borough of Slough – registration was increased 
by more than 10 per cent, but in some others the change was minimal. 
 
High turnout and increased registration were likely to involve more young voters and 
thereby assist the Remain campaign, so across the LADs places with high turnout and large increases 
in the number of registered electors should display lower support for Brexit than predicted by our 
model. To test whether that was the case, turnout and registration change were included in a 
regression model with actual Leave vote in each LAD as the dependent variable and our predicted 
vote as a further independent. (Because data on electorate change were not available for all LADs in 
Scotland the regression including this variable was run for England and Wales only.) Models II and III 
in the regressions in Table 3 show that both of the additional variables were significantly linked to 
the pattern of voting Brexit, in the expected direction, and that their inclusion substantially 
improved the goodness of fit. Support for Leave was significantly lower than expected in places with 
high turnout and also in those with substantial increases in the number of registered voters in the 
months leading up to the referendum. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Given those differences, were there any further residual patterns; were there, as some 
commentators argued, regional variations indicative of geographical patterns of support for Brexit 
that were unrelated to the two demographic characteristics included in the models plus LAD 
differences plus turnout and registration change?; were people in particular regions – holding age 
and qualifications constant – more or less likely to vote for Brexit than their contemporaries 
elsewhere? To address this – for England and Wales only – a further model was run with a series of 
dummy variables representing regions, with West Midlands (which had the highest proportion of 
support for Leave – 0.60) as the comparator. The result, Model IV in Table 3, shows three regions 
where the mean support for Leave was significantly less than in the West Midlands: London, the 
Southeast, and the Northwest. 
 
That local authorities in London and the Southeast on average gave less support to Leave 
than comparable places in the West Midlands (by as many as ten percentage points in the case of 
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London) suggests that in general residents of the country’s most prosperous regions were – other 
things being equal – more favourably inclined towards membership of the EU than their 
contemporaries elsewhere. But was that the case across London as a whole? Figure 7 graphs the 
predicted proportions who voted Leave across LADs in England and Wales against the actual 
proportions, from Model III in Table 3 (i.e. excluding the regional variables). LADs in London (the 32 
London Boroughs plus the City of London) are separately identified. Some, but not all, clearly deviate 
from the general pattern. 
 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The largest residuals from that regression are shown in Table 4 in unstandardised form: 
those where the observed vote for Leave was 10 percentage points or more lower than predicted 
are in the left-hand column; those where support for Leave was under-predicted by more than ten 
points are in the right-hand column. Although the two largest over-predictions (where support for 
Leave was 18-20 points less than on average for places with similar demographic characteristics, 
turnout and change in the electoral register) are in central London, as is the fourth largest, there is 
no clear evidence of a central London pattern: indeed, Enfield, where Brexit support was 10 points 
less than expected, is an outer suburb, as also is Richmond-upon-Thames (a borough which has 
given strong support to EU-favouring Liberal Democrat political candidates in recent decades: at the 
2015 general election the seat was won by a Conservative candidate with 58 per cent of the votes; at 
a by-election in December 2016 following his resignation it was won by a Liberal Democrat candidate 
with just under 50 per cent of the votes, the party’s candidate having obtained only 19 per cent at 
the general election). Five of the other LADs listed there are in the Southeast region. All are in 
London’s commuter belt but none are in those parts of the Home Counties (such as districts in Essex 
and Kent) that contain concentrations of the ‘left behind’. Three of those areas – Basildon, Medway 
and Thurrock – are in the list of areas where support for Leave was substantially under-predicted, as 
is Rushmoor (which contains one of the main concentrations of the British army in Aldershot and 
surrounding towns) but also Welwyn-Hatfield, part of London’s Hertfordshire commuter-shed. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In general, therefore, these residuals from Model III do not suggest any further general 
features of a range of places that can account for the choices expressed there in the referendum; 
that they differ from the general trends appears to reflect individual place-specific influences. 
London and Scotland stand out as regions where average support for Leave was less than expected – 
other things being equal; that voters in the Northwest also gave slightly less support for Brexit than 
other regions is probably linked to its – and especially parts of Merseyside’s – relatively large 
population of Irish descent (Irish politicians argued strongly that the UK should remain within the 
EU).11 Elsewhere, knowledge of a local authority’s age structure and its residents’ educational 
qualifications was sufficient to account for over two-thirds of the variation in the voters’ response to 
the referendum question, with information on turnout levels and the size of the electoral register 
adding strength to that conclusion.12 
 
                                                          
11 Northern Ireland voted in favour of Remain by 56:44. 
12 We also fitted a series of Model Vs that incorporated interactions between region and our predicted Leave 
percentage. Several were slightly significant, but the only one of substantial interest – and the only one with a 
positive regression coefficient for the interaction variable – involved London. The positive coefficient indicated 
that the city, despite its low overall support for Brexit, was more polarised than other regions: where the 
percentage of old people with few qualifications was low, the percentage voting Leave was lower than 
expected: where there were large numbers of older, less-educated residents (mainly in some outer suburbs) 
the percentage voting Leave was less than expected. 
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Local variations 
 
Although the referendum results were only to be published by LADs, a small number of authorities 
also published the outcome in each of their wards – though excluding the postal votes, which were 
counted centrally. We use those results for two cities – Birmingham and Plymouth – to provide a 
further test of our model’s veracity. 
 
[FIGURES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For each city we took our estimated matrix of voting Leave by age and qualifications and 
applied those proportions to the 2001 census matrix of age by qualifications in each ward. This gave 
an estimated proportion voting Leave for each ward in each place, which could be compared with 
the actual proportions. As with the national pattern, the predictions understated the level of support 
for Leave, and in addition the predicted range across the wards in each place was much smaller than 
the actual variation. Nevertheless, as Figures 8 and 9 show, the relative pattern was fairly accurately 
replicated in both places: the r2 value for the Birmingham equation in Figure 8 is 0.69 and for 
Plymouth in Figure 9 it is 0.60 – with no obvious major residuals in either case. (Note that in 
Birmingham especially the pattern of support for Brexit was much more varied across the forty 
wards than predicted by the modelling.) In each city the lowest support for Brexit was in the wards 
with most students and – in Birmingham especially – those with most members of Black and Asian 
minorities. Nationally, there was no relationship between an LAD’s minority population and support 
for Brexit, reflecting the small size of such minority populations in most places; but where there 
were substantial concentrations – as in parts of Birmingham – support was much lower than 
expected given the age structure and qualifications of the population in those wards. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In part, the results of the analyses presented here do not differ substantially from those produced by 
other studies, using different, less-sophisticated modelling strategies. In confirming those findings, 
and thus their interpretations regarding which groups in the population favoured Brexit, however, 
the results of this modelling provide further insights into the socio-economic-political divisions 
within contemporary British society, in particular whether they are geographically-based. Support 
for Brexit was strongly focused in older age groups, especially older people with no or few 
educational qualifications, and to the extent that these are concentrated in particular areas – 
including those that have suffered most economically from the de-industrialisation and neo-
liberalism policies initiated in the 1980s – then voting Brexit was spatially concentrated accordingly. 
Indeed, other than the interacted variables – age and qualifications – only three other clear patterns 
were identified across Great Britain as a whole. First, those places where turnout was high and 
where lots of people joined the electoral register in the six months prior to the referendum had 
lower support for Brexit than predicted by the basic model (I in Table 3). This suggests that where 
substantial numbers of younger voters were encouraged to register as electors and/or vote in the 
referendum – campaigns which were to a considerable extent place-specific – the Remain campaign 
performed better than average, as of course it did in Scotland, which is the second clear finding 
(although turnout averaged only 68 per cent there, compared to 72 per cent in Wales and 74 per 
cent in England). Finally, on average, too, London’s boroughs gave below-average support to the 
Leave campaign, although later examination suggested that this was particularly concentrated in 
certain parts of the capital only. 
 
There was a geography to voting for Brexit, therefore, and to a considerable extent it was a 
geography which matched that of the country’s current socio-economic condition. It was not, 
however, a replication of earlier such geographies. It was not a simple north-south divide; nor did it 
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match the geographies of support for the three political parties that have contested all seats at 
general elections over recent decades – though it did closely match that of support for UKIP, the 
party that pressed for the referendum and argued strongly for Leave. Each of the country’s two 
largest political parties were divided over the issue, among both their MPs and their supporters. 
Most Labour MPs supported Remain, but according to the British Election Study only 62 per cent of 
Labour voters in 2015 did so. Labour Brexit supporters were concentrated in its northern 
constituencies, as illustrated by the equal-area cartogram in Figure 10, which shows the 
constituencies won by the two major parties – Conservative and Labour – in 2015 according to the 
referendum majority. Of Labour’s 232 seats, 148 returned a majority for Leave, including the great 
majority of those in northern England and Wales (Labour’s traditional heartlands, along with 
Scotland where the SNP won all but three of the seats in 2015); only in London and several major 
cities (Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield) did some Labour seats 
return majorities for Remain. The great majority of Conservative constituencies outside London and 
the relatively affluent parts of the southeast voted to leave the EU. 
 
[FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Brexit negotiations that follow will need to satisfy the concerns of those who voted for 
Leave, both tackling the local conditions in the areas where they are concentrated and rebuilding 
trust there in the national political parties and politicians. (After the referendum UKIP increased its 
campaigning in areas of traditional Labour strength in the north of England where many of the 
‘anxious class’ feel that a London-focused Labour party no longer represents their interests;13 at a 
by-election in Stoke-on-Trent, where Leave obtained 69 per cent support in the referendum, UKIP 
failed at its first post-Brexit attempt to displace Labour, however, winning only 24.7 per cent of the 
votes, compared to 22.7 per cent at the 2015 general election.) As Los et al. (2017) have shown, the 
regions that gave strongest support to Brexit have benefited most from exporting goods to the EU in 
recent years. At the same time, policies will need to reassure those in the areas which supported 
Remain that the economic prosperity delivered there by decades of neo-liberal globalisation will be 
sustained, otherwise those areas too may develop increasing distrust in the political class. A divided 
country is not easily governed, particularly an almost evenly-divided country. 
 
Finally, the analyses reported here are based on a modelling strategy designed to predict 
spatial patterns when one of the data sets deployed – derived from surveys or polls – is insufficiently 
large to provide robust information about the situation across a range of places. That strategy has as 
yet not been widely deployed, but its use here has clearly demonstrated its utility in exploring the 
geography of a vote before it has taken place, given the availability of polling and census (or similar) 
data. The modelling reported here used just two characteristics of the individuals polled – and 
interacted them rather than treating them as separate variables – yet it predicted the geography of 
voting well before the event with considerable success, not only at the macro-scale of local 
authorities across the entire country but also at the micro-scale of wards within individual 
authorities. Apart from its academic interest, therefore, this approach has considerable potential 
applied value: it can focus attention on areas where campaigning might be concentrated, for 
example.14 A tool developed more than a decade ago has been under-utilised in the analysis of a 
                                                          
13 http://labourlist.org/2016/10/james-morris-labour-has-taken-working-class-voters-for-granted-ukip-offers-
them-a-political-choice/ (accessed 31 October 2016) 
14 Our predictions were published in April, some three months before the referendum, and attracted 
considerable attention in the financial service industries. Because the actual results were to be published by 
LAD as they were ready, and this was expected to cover several hours, speculators (in the value of the pound, 
for example) were interested to know how soon they could be certain of the outcome during that sequence of 
result publication. (As it happened there was no clear pattern that areas that were likely to support one option 
rather than the other would declare later or sooner.) 
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potentially wide range of patterns; this paper should revive interest in its potential for 
understanding local environmental variations. 
 
There has been much tension in debates regarding a wide range of public policies in Great 
Britain as to whether they should be focused on people – irrespective of geography – or on places. 
The result of the EU referendum has rekindled such debate: the Prime Minister appointed soon after 
the result made clear that her government’s policies would focus in particular on those ‘just about 
managing’ (the JAMs) – the people who provided the greatest support for Brexit. Should those 
policies have a spatial component? The analyses reported here imply not, because – with the 
exceptions of London and Scotland – there were no clear spatial variations in the proportion who 
voted to leave the EU once major socio-demographic differences were taken into account. But it is 
difficult to disentangle people and places – the types of people who supported the Leave campaign 
were concentrated in particular places (albeit very different ones, ranging from declining seaside 
resorts through to areas that have experienced substantial de-industrialisation). Designing policies to 
satisfy both the JAMs, who expect major changes in their economic and social well-being as a result 
of the UK’s departure from the EU, and those who favoured Remain, who do not wish their well-
being to suffer as a consequence of the withdrawal, will require a great deal of geographical 
sensitivity if trust in the political apparatus is to be rebuilt across the country. 
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Table 1. Differences by age, sex and educational qualifications in voting UKIP at the 2015 general 
election. (Rates significantly different from the overall rate of 1.0 are shown in bold.) 
 
Sex  Female   Male 
Qualifications 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
18-25 0.79 0.75 0.39 0.30 0.91 1.10 0.63 0.58 
26-35 1.16 0.80 0.69 0.35 1.34 0.96 0.73 0.48 
36-45 1.48 1.17 0.91 0.51 0.95 1.63 1.03 0.68 
46-55 0.77 1.46 1.03 0.69 2.23 1.91 1.26 1.06 
56-65 1.67 1.49 0.90 0.69 2.14 2.05 1.24 1.14 
65< 1.57 1.21 0.99 0.84 1.89 1.60 1.40 1.22 
 
Column 1 refers to those with no or only level 1 qualifications; columns 2-4 refer to those with levels 
2, 3 and 4 qualifications respectively. 
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Table 2. The predicted proportion of individuals in Great Britain in each age and qualifications 
category who would vote Leave. 
 
 
Age/Qualifications None Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
18-24 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.14 
25-34 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.21 
35-49 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.28 
50-64 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.35 
65< 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.54 0.40 
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Table 3. Regressions of the proportion voting Leave in each LAD. 
 
Model I II III IV 
Constant -0.035 0.145 0.342 0.510 
 (0.021) (0.045) (0.046) (0.052) 
Predicted Leave 1.433 1.501 1.354 1.183 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051) 
Turnout - -0.281 -0.418 -0.527 
  (0.062) (0.059) (0.063)  
Change in Register - - -0.626 -0.460 
   (0.144) (0.133) 
Region (comparator: West Midlands) 
London - - - -0.100 
    (0.013) 
East of England - - - -0.012 
    (-0.011) 
East Midlands - - - 0.007 
    (0.011) 
Southeast - - - -0.031 
    (0.011) 
Southwest - - - -0.022 
    (0.012) 
Northwest - - - -0.035 
    (0.012) 
Yorkshire/Humber - - - -0.002 
    (0.013) 
Northeast - - - -0.006 
    (0.016) 
R2 0.668 0.684 0.717 0.778 
N 380 380 348 348 
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Table 4.  The largest residuals from Model III 
 
Local Authority Region Difference Local Authority Region Difference 
City of London London -0.20 Amber Valley E Midlands +0.17 
Kensington & Chelsea London -0.18 N Warwickshire W Midlands +0.14 
Sefton Northwest -0.13 Newcastle-under-Lyme  W Midlands +0.12 
Islington London -0.12 Medway Southeast +0.12 
East Hampshire Southeast -0.12 NE Lincolnshire Yorkshire +0.11 
Mid Sussex Southeast -0.12 Welwyn-Hatfield East +0.11 
Wycombe Southeast -0.12 Taunton Deane Southwest +0.10 
Tunbridge Wells Southeast -0.11 Basildon East +0.10 
Southwark London -0.11 Thurrock East +0.10 
Richmond-upon-Thames London -0.10 Rushmoor Southeast +0.10 
Merthyr Tydfil Wales -0.10 South Holland East +0.10 
South Hams Southwest -0.10 
South Bucks Southeast -0.10 
Enfield London -0.10 
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Figure 1. Histogram of the number of observations for each local authority in the polling data set. 
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Figure 2. The predicted geography of voting Leave – those where the predicted percentage voting 
Leave exceeded the predicted percentage voting Remain are separately identified. 
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Figure 3. The relationship between the proportion voting Leave in the 2016 referendum and the 
proportion who voted for UKIP at the 2014 European Parliament election. (LADs in Scotland are 
separately identified.) 
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Figure 4. The result of the 2016 referendum: the percentage who voted Leave 
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Figure 5. The relationship between the proportion voting Leave and the predicted proportion (Model 
I in Table 3) 
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Figure 6. Turnout at the referendum 
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Figure 7. The relationship between the proportion voting Leave and the predicted proportion from 
Model III (Table 3) (London boroughs are separately identified). 
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Figure 8. The predicted and actual proportions who voted Leave in Birmingham’s wards 
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Figure 9. The predicted and actual proportions who voted Leave in Plymouth’s wards 
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Figure 10. An equal-area cartogram of British constituencies showing the outcome of the 2015 
general election and the (estimated) Brexit vote in each for the Conservative and Labour parties. 
 
